| Title Page Previous Next Contents | Part 1. A Day of Disaster >Emergency response |
First
to respond in New York City and Arlington County, Va., of course, were local
firefighters, police and other rescue workers. Many were lost as the buildings
collapsed in New York City; in fact about one-sixth of the dead were themselves
those who had gone in to rescue and evacuate building occupants. No first
responders, fortunately, were lost at the Pentagon.
Fortunately,
as big cities, New York City and Arlington, Va., on the edge of the nation’s
capital, had an “incident command system” in place that specified a protocol to
integrate the many agencies into one coordinated system, to avoid confused,
delayed or redundant response efforts. This standardized management system, a
paradigm used by the fire service since the 1970s has been adopted by more and
more cities, helped to some extent. (9)
But
when disaster struck, New York City emergency officials were caught off-guard
because critical elements of the safety infrastructure—911 communication
systems, emergency management, and the coordinating system for first
responders—had been hard hit.
The
biggest challenge to that city’s overall emergency response was that the city’s
Office of Emergency Management, which had been well organized and well funded
but also headquartered at the World Trade Center, lost its entire command
center. The agency intended to coordinate the emergency response among myriad
agencies, it was forced to evacuate in the early chaotic hours of the disaster.
Many telephone, power and computer lines were down. And because the police had
closed lower Manhattan, it was very difficult even for officials to get past
checkpoints without badges.
When cell phones didn’t work, “email was a
bit of a savior for people,” says Richard Cole, supervisor at the Arlington
County Environmental Health division.
That
left the first responders reeling in their initial response--and also affected
the environmental health response. Because power had been cut off, some of the
air-sampling monitors weren’t working; cell phones and communications were
spotty, if functioning at all, because suddenly thousands of people were trying
to use their cell phones. Many firefighters may have not have heard the order
to evacuate the buildings because of failures of hand-held radios, according to
the Kinsey Report commissioned by the New York Fire Department. (10)
Many
of the offices concerned with environmental health, such as the Environmental
Protection Agency’s Region II office, and the city’s Department of Health
itself, both of which evacuated employees and closed, were within blocks of the
World Trade Center. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration, based in
the top floor of World Trade Center Building 6, evacuated all its employees
before that building collapsed. (11)
In
the process, the DOH building was unexpectedly transformed into a “triage”
area, as staff and civilians brought the injured into the lobby for medical
treatment.
At
the Pentagon, as in Manhattan, communications breakdowns were a big problem
too. In fact, say experts, “lack of communications was the greatest weakness in
this disaster.” (12)
Inside
the Pentagon, communications couldn’t be transmitted out due to security; some
of the District’s counties didn’t have compatible communications frequencies,
with Arlington County—the incident commander—and all of Northern Virginia using
800 Megaherz and Maryland using something else, for example. A virus shut down
computers in nearby Fairfax County. (13)
When
cell phones didn’t work, “email was a bit of a savior for people,” says Richard
Cole, supervisor
at the Arlington County Department of Human Services’ Environmental Health
Bureau. “Unless you had two-way
capability, cell phones were ineffective,” he adds. That made his job of trying
to get staff coverage particularly challenging: “I spent a lot of hours trying
to get people because we were so short-staffed,” he says.
Nevertheless,
here, thanks to pre-planning, many of the agencies had preprogrammed Arlington
County’s radio frequency in order to communication, and there was a limited
supply of other compatible portables on hand to fill in the gaps for other law
enforcement agencies in the region. (14)
At
the Pentagon, in contrast with New York, the incident command system and the
system designed for “all hazard consequence management” worked superbly, say
experts. That was partly because the operation was under a single command. The
Arlington County Fire Department. Emergency teams worked well together in part
due to pre-established relationships, adequate resources and prior experience
in emergencies, according to John Harrald, of the Institute for Crisis,
Disaster, and Risk Management at George Washington University. In Washington,
some of the first responders were seasoned responders at the Oklahoma City
bombing as well as a prior tragedy, an airlines crash at National Airport. (15)
By
contrast with the Pentagon, New York’s response was one of huge “organizational
complexity,” according to Harrald, who tracked a list of as many as 449
organizations responding to the emergency, including 159 from the public sector
alone.
Even
the last terrorist attack on the World Trade Center buildings had not prepared
New York City for this event. In the last incident, which occurred on February 29, 1993, a
bombing in the parking garage of the World Trade Center resulted in the deaths
of five people and thousands of injuries. The bomb left a crater 200 by 100
feet wide and five stories deep. (16)
This
time around, New York needed all the reinforcements it could get.
Among
the more uniquely difficult challenges that responders have named: The sheer
scope and scale of the incident, its cause, the number of human lives taken,
the environmental destruction, the physical devastation, the financial impact
globally and locally, the concentrated geographic area, the involvement of
multiple agencies, and the international scope of its ramification.
Environmental
and public health touched on a good number of these challenges, as well as many
of the key functions involved in the cleanup—firefighting, urban search and
rescue, recovery of crime scene evidence, medical emergency care, public works
(debris removal, construction and deconstruction), traffic control, public
health (sanitation, control of dust inhalation, isolation of dead bodies, or
the injured), removal of hazardous materials, and mortuary operations.
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Photo: Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs
Division; Don Halasy |
At
the Pentagon, too, there was extra stress because of being within the ‘orbit’
of other potential terrorist hijackings—news of the diverted plane to
Pennsylvania having just been announced. Because of rumors flying, fire
fighters and emergency responders at the Pentagon left the scene at one point
when it was believed that another terrorist attack was underway, leading to
confusion and worry that rescue opportunities might have been lost. Government
buildings, including the Capitol and the White House, were evacuated with
officials citing a credible threat of yet another terrorist attack. Soon after law enforcement officials
reported that a car bomb had exploded outside of State Department in
Washington, D.C., an event that is later proven false.
In
many ways rescue workers at the Pentagon were better equipped. Although
officials in Arlington County would never ask for a disaster to come their way,
many admit that they were equipped with some inherent advantages.
Dodie
Gill, director of Arlington’s Employee Assistance Program (EAP), was down at
the Pentagon soon after the plane crash,
“offering critical incident stress management to public safety
employees.” Months later, she hates to admit that “Arlington was a perfect
model” for operating optimally in a disaster situation. Arlington, being at the
center of government and the military, was uniquely situated to respond to a
major fire and rescue incident of this scale. “You almost couldn’t ask for a
better scenario,” says Gill.
“I
turned on my heel when I heard the news of the crashes,” she recalls, “and got
moving. I thought, ‘That’s us." Because traffic was completely
grid locked, she and her staff walked about a mile to the nearest fire station,
where they were immediately deployed to an off-site rehab center. By evening,
she says, “we were at the Pentagon, doing what they could to provide support
and comfort to our fire and rescue people."
(For
an interesting interview with Dodie Gill and Capt. Bob Gray )
http://www.burningissues.com/Wellness%20Week%202003.htm
The
successes the fire department claimed that day Gill credits to EAP’s past
experience in rendering critical incident stress management, especially its
underlying credo and modus operandi of care giving. “We believe in order to
perform, public employees, no matter what agencies, have to be protected and
cared for,” says Gill, who was credited for her extra preparedness and care,
arriving on the scene before others, in Arlington
County’s “After Action Report,” completed several months after the attacks.
This, report notes, demonstrated “that taking care to the firefighter is
as important as taking care of the firefighter.”
That day, says Gill, every effort was made to keep it a safe and
healthy work environment. “We kept firefighters and rescue workers hydrated
with water and made sure they had clean underwear,” says Gill.
Of
course, the teamwork didn’t begin or end that day, she stresses, but is an
ongoing process based on trust and understanding built over years of work and
longevity of relationships. Months later, Gill would join an
energetic team of her co-workers—firefighters and other responders—in
commemorating the lives of those lost on 9/11 with a days’ long bike-a-thon
ride between New York’s Ground Zero and the Pentagon.