| Title Page Previous Next Contents | Part 2. The day after: How officials responded >Unique challenges |
Typically,
OSCs go into hazardous situations needing to monitor for a particular toxic
chemical or set of chemicals—as might be of concern in a hazardous truck spill
on the highway. But this mode was not adopted.
“Our
initial response wasn’t viewed as a hazmat response,” says Touw. “When you have
something like gas venting or a tank car derailed with a hole in it and
spilling, then you evacuate the area, and neutralize it to stop it. ”
The
pollution threat here was quite different. Here there were huge plumes of fumes
and dust laced with unknown chemicals.
“In
this situation, the problem was a huge volume of debris with small amounts of
hazardous materials, as well as large plumes of smoke containing unknown
byproducts of so many things—burning plastics, carpets, computer parts,” says
Touw. It was difficult to say how much PCB or heavy-metal content might be
present or “could be burned off,” he
says.
What
rescue workers and New Yorkers might be breathing as a result of the fallout at
Ground Zero was only one of many concerns Touw was “tasked with.” Within
several days EPA had dispatched ten special vacuum truck equipped with HEPA
filters to clean dust off the streets of Lower Manhattan.
Also
unique to this disaster for EPA’s Touw was the vast range of
environmental-oriented tasks needing to be addressed. Besides air and dust
monitoring there was also:
Touw
and his team would erect what was called the “Taj Mahal,” the largest test for
workers ever built, a 31,000 square foot heated area where workers could wash
off their hands and face and boots, shower, and get a hot meal. “It was a dome
the size of a football field,” Touw recalls, a structure for which $75 million
was earmarked by FEMA, capable of serving 10,000 people per day, 24/7, for four
months.
After
it was built, of course, the dome would house respirators, booties, military
tents, water for rehydrating equipment—and equipment for “disposal of all that
stuff.” Early on, Touw remembers they were instructed not to call them
“decontamination” stations.
Planning
for this winterized ‘biosphere’ dome on the night of September 16th,
Touw remembers, “We pulled an all-nighter.”
If
Region II emergency personnel would be stretched, so would the agency as a
whole, as former EPA Administrator Christie Whitman would argue in her
testimony before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works September
24, 2002. EPA, she said, “responded to three national incidents”
simultaneously: not just at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and the
Pennsylvania crash and would be responding to the anthrax attacks too.
September 11th was unprecedented
in yet another way—perhaps for the first time, government coffers were laid
wide open.
But
EPA and other agencies were not stretched financially at all.
September 11th
was unprecedented in yet another way—perhaps for the first time, government
coffers were laid wide open, as the President and Congress enacted a $40
billion emergency response package to help deal with the tragic events of
September 11. The funding, according to the government, would “ensure that the
U.S. had the resources to respond to and recover from the attacks and to
protect national security.”
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Photo: Earl Dotter |
With $2 billion, FEMA supported overall emergency
assistance in New York and other affected jurisdictions. This went to pay the
costs of such items as debris removal and
emergency protective measures, as well as individual
and family assistance, search and rescue, and other disaster assistance
efforts.
In this
authorization, the President gave FEMA “an unprecedented level of assistance.”
For example, the President gave FEMA enough funding to pay for 100 percent of
public assistance activities in New York and at the Pentagon (typically, states
pay 25 percent of these costs). This would mark “the first time FEMA covered
the entire share of public assistance expenses,” according to the text
of an October 3 White House fact sheet on responding to the September 11
terrorist attacks.
That filtered down to city agencies as well.
“For the first time
I can remember, we didn’t have any resource constraints,” recalls the city
DOH’s McKinney. “I could call anyone and say, I need this or that; there was no
problem with contracting processes.”